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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
and the Wyoming Constitution, which was adopted in 1889, are
very similar to ours. In each of these constitutions the articles
pertaining to the legislature are expressed in the negative lan-
guage of limitation, while the articles pertaining to the execu-
tive are expressed in the affirmative language of grant.
A good case could be made for following their interpreta-
tion. But such a rule in view of our present stage in under-
standing the Montana Constitution is too glib to be reliable. It
seems that we can better arrive at the nature of the Montana
Constitution by a piecemeal approach. Each of the executive
offices and the court systems should be separately analyzed to
determine the nature of their particular powers. Appeals in
the offing concerning the Attorney General's power should prove
helpful. In the meantime, it would be best to return to the earlier
Montana holding that the Constitution is a limitation upon legis-
lative authority. And almost certainly at least that much is true.
LOUIS FORSELL
MONTANA HOMESTEAD LAWS; THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO BANKRUPTCY
I. In General: The Homestead Laws of Montana.
At the common law some exemptions from execution were
known both in England' and the United States! but there was no
generally recognized right of homestead. The Republic of Texas
in an act dated January 26, 1839 produced the first actual legis-
lation on the subject.! In our own state the Constitution specifies
that "the legislative assembly shall enact liberal homestead and
exemption statutes."' Subsequently laws were passed following
this general mandate' and the Supreme Court in the case of
Mitchell v. McCormick announced that the statutes then in effect
were to carry out that purpose.! The laws were enacted for the
debtor and were to be liberally construed." The needs served by
the allowance of the realty exemption are usually stated to be
security of the home, the encouragement of building the home,
attraction of people to unsettled areas, the general building up
of the community through the absence of pauperism and the con-
'Blackstone, III Commentaries (4th) 412 ff.
2Haskins, G. L., Home8tead, Exemption8, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1291.8id. Source: Laws of Texas, 3rd Congress, 1st session.
'Constitution of the State of Montana, Art. XIX, § 4.
5First noted in the Montana Code in 1895. But note that Montana home-
stead laws date from the Bannack statutes of the Sixties.
022 Mont. 249, 56 Pac. 216 (1899).
'Oregon Mfg. Co. v. Dunbar (1930) 87 Mont. 603, 289 Pac. 559.
1
Holter: Montana Homestead Laws: Their Relationship to Bankruptcy
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1954
NOTES AND COMMENT
sequential lowering of the burden upon the public and the general
security and independence of the members of the family.!
In regard to the extent of the allowance, something different
prevails in Montana than is the usual rule in other jurisdictions.
Here urban homesteaders have an area allowance of one-fourth
acre while their neighbors in the country are allowed a maximum
of 320 acres. Either can have a dwelling house upon the proper-
ty, but in neither case can the value of the land and dwelling ex-
ceed $2,500. Seemingly the code by the use of the language "pro-
vided, however, that in any proceedings instituted to determine
the value of such homestead, the assessed value of such land, with
included appurtenances, if any . . . as appears on the last com-
pleted assessment roll . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the
value of the property claimed as a homestead" fixes the time
at which the value is determined as that of the institution of
proceedings."° California by very express provision fixes the
value as of the time of any levy of execution thereon.' No penal-
ty would result to the declarant if too little land or value was
declared; there are, however, express prohibitions on excessive
declarations. Such excessive declarations can be of two classes:
first, the claiming of property worth more than the statutory
allowed value ($2,500) and secondly the claiming of a greater
area of land than is specifically allowed. The latter type of claim
has uniformly been held to be fatal to the existence of any home-
stead," while the former problem is met by the setting aside a part
of the property-a dwelling and lot-if the property is so divisi-
ble,' or if it is not, by sale of the land and dwelling, ' paying from
the proceeds thereof the value of the homestead exemption max-
imum ($2,500) to the debtor and then the excess to the creditor.'
Note that the payment to the debtor is exempt from further pro-
cess for a period of six months, during which time he can turn
the cash into another homestead.' The reason for the distinction
between the two excessive declaration situations is probably first
that there is a method for the creditor to petition the district
court for the appointment of appraisers when he has a judg-
eSee Haskins, supra.
0R.C.M. 1947, § 33-124.
'jid. See generally § 33-110 through 33-116 also.
'Civ. Code Calif. 1949, § 1260.
"Yerrick v. Higgins (1899) 22 Mont. 502, 57 Pac. 95 and McCarthy v.
Kelley (1922) 63 Mont. 233, 206 Pac. 782.
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ment not of certain classes7' to determine the value of the exemp-
tion, whereas nothing is said of area in the code. Secondly, it is
fairly easy to determine the problem of acreage with a consider-
able degree of accuracy due to fixed and constant standards
while the problem of value is always one of conjecture and opin-
ion having little or no criteria. This is the view of Chief Justice
Brantly in a Supreme Court decision."
The filing of a homestead is limited expressly to the "head
of a family" and may be out of the separate property of such
person except in the case of married persons where the selection
may be out of the separate property of the wife if she gives her
consent."0 On the other hand, the wife does not need the hus-
band's consent to select a homestead out of his separate proper-
ty.' The term "head of a family" includes the husband or the
wife; or a person over 65 years of age; or a person residing on
the premises and having under his care and maintenance a minor
child of certain classes, a parent of certain classes, an unmarried
sister or any of the other relatives mentioned who has attained
the age of majority and is unable to care for himself.' The court
has included in the definition an abandoned wife' in one instance
and a father supporting minor children who had been awarded
to the custody of the other spouse in a divorce decree in another
instance.' A widow whose daughter was of age and working
away from home was declared to be a "head of family" for ex-
emption purposes when it was shown that the widow was caring
for her granddaughter-a child of the working daughter-while
the latter was away working." The homestead declaration need
only state that the person is the "head of a family" and does not
need to go into the details thereof.'
'Specifically, those cases covered in § 33-105 which allow execution and
forced sale on judgments obtained (1) before declaration of homestead,
(2) on mechanic's and vendor's liens, (3) debts secured by mortgages
on the premises executed by both husband and wife, (4) debts secured
by mortgages before filing homestead for record.
"In Yerrick v. Higgins, supra. In that case, the court held that an aver-
age of 2100 square feet on a one-fourth acre declaration was too large
for the court to overlook, despite the fact that the court would treat as
vain small inconsequential matters.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 33-125. See generally § 33-102 and § 33-103. This Is
probably another example of where the code says "may" for "must."
lid. § 33-122 and § 33-126. Also see Mennel v. Wells (1915 51 Mont. 141,
149 P. 954.
"Specifically, a minor child of his own, or of his or her wife or husband,
or former wife or husband; a minor grandchild, brother or sister or
child thereof; a parent or grandparent of self or of husband or wife.
"Mennel v. Wells, supra.
"DeFontenay v. Childs (1933) 93 Mont. 480, 19 P. (2) 650.
"Esterly v. Broadway Garage (1930) 87 Mont. 64. 285 P. 172.
2'id.
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The estate in land which will be exempted varies from one
jurisdiction to another; some require a fee simple, while others
are willing to allow lesser interests to be declared.' If the man-
date of liberal exemption laws is to be applied, it would seem
that jurisdictions allowing the lesser interests to be declared are
more in conformance with that spirit. On this point there is
nothing definite to be found in the Montana Code, but it would
seem that the cases would go along with the more liberal view.
An early case held that the exemption could be had on lands be-
longing to the United States and "the homestead right given by
statute is impressed on the land to the extent of the interests of
the claimant in it, not on the title merely. The actual homestead,
as against everybody who has not a better title, becomes im-
pressed with the legal homestead right, by taking the proceedings
proscribed by the statute." Again, "whether the title to land is
good or bad is not a matter that concerns the creditor.' Thus
we have naked possession alone without any title whatsoever giv-
ing the homestead exemption; this, of course, subject to the rights
of the true owner. Further, the fact that the debtor owns the
land in conjunction with another does not defeat the claim. An
early case on this point said "there is no pretense that the word
'owner' cannot be applied to a tenant in common. There is no
pretense that he cannot lawfully occupy all and every part of the
premises, to the exclusion of all the world except his co-tenant.
Why cannot 160 acres (note: the then existing area limitation) or
the fourth part of an acre, more or less, be as easily set apart to
the cotenant as well as to the owner of the entirety ?"' Today
it is certain that the undivided interest will be protected as a
homestead.' It must be borne in mind, however, that the un-
divided interest must not exceed the maximum allowance of 320
acres or one-fourth acre as the case may be; these areas being
the total that any homestead might affect. Thus a homestead
declaration on an undivided interest in, say, 400 acres, would be
void. Just as the cotenancy in land is recognized, similarly is the
interest of a partner in the partnership estate.' Another word of
caution here: there must be actual occupancy of the land claimed
as a homestead in order to exempt it from sale or execution.'
The Montana Code states that the actual declaration must
'Anno. 89 A.L.R. 511 (1934).
"Watterson v. E. I,. Bonner Co. et al (1897) 19 Mont. 554, 48 P. 1108.
2LLndley v. Davis (1887) 7 Mont. 206, 14 P. 717.
'McCarthy v. Kelley (1922) supra, Wall v. Duggan (1926) 76 Mont. 239,
245 P. 293.
'Furgeson v. Spelth (1893) 13 Mont. 487, 34 Pac. 1020.
'Power v. Burd (1896) 18 Mont. 22, 43 P. 1094.
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:contain (1) a statement that the person is a head of household
or in the case of the wife, that the husband has not made a dec-
laration and that the same is for their mutual benefit; (2) a state-
ment that the person is residing on the premises and claims them
as a homestead; (3) a description of the premises; (4) an esti-
mate of their actual cash value.' The declaration must be
acknowledged with the same solemnity as a grant of real prop-
erty,' and recorded with the county clerk of the county wherein
the land is situated." Note again the requirements as to area,
value, and occupancy. The sole deviation allowed from the rule
requiring declaration and recordation by the claimant is in the
event a probate homestead should be allowed; in that case, it is
incumbent upon the probate judge to file in the absence of the
decedent's action.' This can be by the court's own motion or by
petition.' The homestead thus authorized to be set aside by the
probate court under probate exemption statutes is the homestead
provided for in the regular homestead sections and must meet the
requirements of value and area.'
The very heart of the existence of the right of declaration
of homestead is the humanity resulting from the exemption from
execution and forced sale. Our code reads "the homestead is
exempt from execution or forced sale, except as in the chapter
provided." Included exceptions are these: (1) where the judg-
ment existed before the declaration was filed for record, which
would be a lien upon the premises; (2) on mechanic's or vendor's
liens; (3) on debts secured by mortgages upon the premises and
signed by both the husband and wife; (4) on debts secured by
mortgages made before the declaration was filed.' In those
enumerated situations, then, the declaration would give no pro-
tection. Interpreting (1) above, the Supreme Court of Montana
held that the filing of a homestead declaration after levy on a
writ of attachment exempted land from sale under execution is-
sued on judgment obtained after declaration was filed.'  The
code says judgment, and that is just what the court demanded.
This treatment is to be contrasted with some jurisdictions where
the criteria is sale. In the case under consideration, some weight
-R.C.M. 1947, § 33-127.
"id. § 33-126.
-id. § 33-128.
*id. § 91-2402. This is the "probate homestead" section, but note that
other probate exemptions are included.
'Bullerdick v. Hermsmeyer (1907) 32 Mont. 541, 81 P. 334.
8In re Trepp's Estate (1924) 71 Mont. 154, 227 P. 1005.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 33-104.
"id. § 33-105.
'Wall v. Duggan, supra.
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was given to the constitutional mandate of liberality. The court
also listened to argument that the general attachment statutes
would govern their decision but held that the specific homestead
statutes would control. Further, it indicated that holding attach-
ments not an exception to the general exemption section did not
take from the plaintiff any vested right he had in the homestead
property. The exemption statutes entered into and constituted
a part of the contract between the parties. This case, then, fixed
the rule regarding the time limit for filing in cases of attachment.
Regarding (2), the mechanic's and vendor's liens, the Montana
court has held that the homestead is subject to the lien for mate-
rial as well as labor where the material and labor were both fur-
nished by the plaintiff." And in a later case the furnishing of
material was held sufficient to raise a mechanic's lien.2 But
money loaned to another cannot, under the doctrine of subroga-
tion, be used to impress a vendor's lien wheie there is no showing
that the money was loaned for the purpose of purchasing a home-
stead." Still another case held similarly where the loaned money
was traced to the purchase of the homestead." (3) There is no
reason why a proper mortgage on the homestead duly executed
by both the husband and wife and acknowledged should not be
subject to the usual process. To hold otherwise would let the
debtor eat his cake and have it; special laws should not provide a
hiding place for him. The court will scrutinize the form care-
fully, however, and in one case protected the wife in her enjoy-
ment of the homestead against a mortgagee seeking to foreclose, it
having been shown that she did not join in the execution of the
mortgage instrument. ' In another case there was an ineffective
mortgage on a homestead while it was occupied; upon the aban-
donment of the homestead, the court said the mortgage did not
gain validity." The treatment of exception (4) above has like-
wise been uniform by the court. Mortgages made before declara-
tion could hardly be deprived of their already vested interest by
any act of the debtor; the mortgaging party has already given
away a security interest in the property and it would be against
the spirit of the law-in spite of humanitarian concepts-to de-
prive the mortgagee of that right. Where, however, the mort-
gage had lapsed as security and ceased to be a mortgage and suit
"Merrigan v. English (1889) 9 Mont. 113, 22 P. 454.
"Bonner v. Minnier (1893) 13 Mont. 269, 34 P. 30.
"DeFontenay v. Childs, supra.
"Mitchell v. McCormick, supra.
"Watterson v. E. L. Bonner Company, supra.
"American Savings and Loan Assn. v. Burghardt (1897) 19 Montana 554,
48 P. 1108.
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was brought upon the mortgage note, the court refused to recog-
nize the security interest and held that an intervening declaration
was effective.'
Included in the exemption is not only the house and the land
upon which it stands, but other appurtenances attached thereto
including outbuildings, fences, and other improvements." It
would be a strange kind of benefit to confer upon a farmer a
house and land free from sale under legal process and then refuse
him a fence to protect the crops grown upon his homestead. Our
code is silent on the subject of rents derived from the premises
and status of growing crops thereupon, but if the pattern of the
other jurisdictios is followed, and absent code provision there is
no reason for it not to be, rents and crops will be subject to the
usual course of sale for satisfaction of judgments."
II. The Relationship of the Homestead Exemption to
Bankruptcy.
The National Bankruptcy Act provides that the act shall not
affect the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the
filing of the petition if the bankrupt has lived in that state for
six months preceeding the filing of the petition.' At the time
the petition is filed, the trustee is vested with the bankrupt's title
to all property "except insofar as it is to property which is held
to be exempt.' This relationship of state and Federal law has
been frequently before the courts; the most common question be-
ing just when homesteads must be filed in order for it to have
the effect of protecting the bankrupt. The Supreme Court of
the United States ruled on this point in the case of White v.
Stump.' That case arose'in Idaho under statutes conforming
practically to the letter to ours, section 5441 providing that the
homestead was subject to forced sale in satisfaction of judgments
obtained before the declaration was filed for record' and section
5469 dating the exemption from the time of such filing" The de-
fendant's wife filed a homestead declaration two months after
the defendant was adjudged a bankrupt on his voluntary petition.
The referee disallowed the exemption. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed the referee saying that when the bankruptcy act
'8Siru v. Sell (1937) 108 Mont. 438, 91 P. (2d) 411.
"Watterson v. E. L. Bonner Co., supra.
"We could well use the California Code as a model on this point; their
code uses the words "products, issues, or profits" of the homestead in
describing the exemptions allowed. Civ. Code Calif. 1949, § 1265.
"'The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 6. (11 USCA 24).
"id. § 70. (11 USCA 110).
2266 US 310, 69 L.Ed. 301, 45 S.Ct. 103. (1924)
"Rev. Code Idaho 1919, § 5441; cf. § 33-105 R.C.M. 1947.
"Rev. Code Idaho 1919, § 5469; cf. R.C.M. 1947 § 33-129.
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spoke of property which was exempt, it referred to some point
of time; that time here was when the property passed out of the
control of the bankrupt except for his exemptions. The exemp-
tions allowed were those which would exempt the property from
levy and sale under state judicial process; the one claimed here
would not. Just as the exemption could not be claimed against
a creditor who levied on the property before a declaration was
filed, so too the exemption is lost against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy who represents all creditors. Thus we have emerging the
general rule that where the homestead is filed before the petition
in bankruptcy it will be protected; where it is filed after petition
it will be of no legal force.
Some states have a different doctrine in regard to the ex-
treme point of time at which the exemption will be recognized.'
Nevada is one such state, allowing the assertion of the homestead
against levying creditors at any time up to the actual sale of the
property." This ought to have its recognition in the courts of
bankruptcy and, as a matter of fact, did in the case of Meyers v.
Matley." In that case, the wife of a bankrupt filed a statutory
declaration a month after the involuntary petition was filed and
the husband adjudged a bankrupt. The Supreme Court of the
United States allowed the homestead, differentiating the situation
here from that in White v. Stump on the basis of the state law
involved.' They said that the right to declare a homestead ex-
isted just as it would have if there had been a levy upon the
property under state law, and in Nevada this declaration could be
made at any time before the sale of the property in the execution.
It was pointed out that the trustee is vested only with the rights
of a creditor holding an equitable or legal lien upon the property
and not with the rights of a purchaser.
Still another situation has arisen under the California judg-
ments act which states that a judgment lien does not automatical-
ly attach by docketing in the office of the clerk of court but an
abstract of the judgment must be recorded with the local county
recorder in order to have a lien attach to the property of the de-
"See the Anno. 145 A.L.R. at 502.
"Nev. Comp. Code (Hillyer, 1929) § 3315, provides that the homestead
"shall not be subject to forced sale on execution or final process from
any court." See also Hawthorne v. Smith (1867) 3 Nev. 182 and Lach-
man v. Walker (1880) 15 Nev. 422 holding that the filing at any time
prior to sale forestalls the sale on execution. After sale, the property
is not exempt.
-(1943) 318 U.S. 622, 87 L.Ed. 1043, 63 S.Ct. 780.
a'Accord: Pallas v. DeJarnette (1944) 145 F. (2) 953; Holahan v. Nugent
(1952) 198 F.(2d) at 658.
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 15 [1954], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol15/iss1/9
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
fendant." This device is thought by the experts to be far in ad-
vance of the system which prevails in most of the other jurisdic-
tions in that it provides a single office for the filing and locating
of all judgments and liens-local and federal. Thus, it is con-
venient for title searchers; at the same time, it eliminates the
likelihood of claimed discrimination or favoritism among courts,
state and federal, by which it is alleged a creditor may establish
a lien more easily in one court than another.' However, in 1950
a bankruptcy court tested the right of a bankrupt to file a home-
stead after petition and adjudication because the judgment there-
in was not filed for record. Previous to White v. Stump, it was
thought that a bankrupt might declare a homestead in California
after petition provided he proceeded to perfect his right within
a reasonable time ;" after White v. Stump, it was thought that
state followed the White doctrine.' The 1950 case in the district
court expressed the view that a judgment lien in California does
not automatically attach either upon rendition or entry of judg-
ment but that it was necessary that an abstract be recorded be-
fore any lien attaches.' The court then distinguished the case at
bar from White v. Stump and said it was governed by Meyers v.
Matley unless the recordation of an abstract of judgment could
be said to be a part of the legal or equitable proceedings in which
the judgment might have been obtained. The court concluded
that it was not, but rather is a voluntary act on the part of the
person making it. On review, the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed
the lower court's finding." The court held that the determina-
tion of the cause rested upon whether the trustee's title was the
same as that of a creditor "holding a lien thereon by legal or
equitable proceedings." It said that if the words connoted judi-
cial proceedings, the language did not cover such liens as the
trustee seeks to assert. Only by recordation of the judgment
abstract does the creditor acquire a lien. In answering the con-
tention that the California judgment is still good between the
parties even without recordation, the court said "we think Con-
gress specified something different from any valid lien when it
"Calif. Code Civ. Proc. 1949, § 674; cf. R.C.M. 1947 § 93-5712. California
contemplates recording with the county recorder, whereas Montana re-
quires filing with the Clerk of Court.
'Rhea v. Smith (1927 274 U.S. 434, 47 S.Ct. 698; Lineker v. Dillon (N.D.
Calif. 1921) 275 F. 460. For a treatment of Federal liens in Montana,
see Weber, Fred, Montana and the Federal Judgment Lien, 8 MONT. L.
Rnv. 65.
"Bryant v. Mayhew et ux; In re Mayhew (1914) 218 F. 422.
2145 A.L.R. at 504.
'In re Curmar Mfg. Co. etal (1950) 91 F. Supp. 647.
"Campsell v. Straub (1951) 189 F. (2d) 379. This is the same case as
In re Curmar Mfg. Co. in the district court.
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specified a lien 'by legal or equitable proceedings.' It seems
reasonable to construe the words last quoted as words of signifi-
cant limitation rather than as surplusage." Further, the court
,felt that the natural connotation of the words suggest a lien
which attaches by force of judicial process. If the Ninth Circuit
had stopped at this point, it would have made a sizeable inroad
to the White v. Stump doctrine, at least as far as California is
concerned. On rehearing, however, the court reversed itself.'
Again the question was the proper characterization of the lien.
This time, the court held that although the recordation of the ab-
stract is independent in the sense of being voluntary, it is in-
cidental to judicial proceedings-in sense a device to give par-
ticular additional effect. The judgment is the basic fundamental
source of rights whether generally before recordation or by way
of lien afterwards. Decisions of state courts, however respected,
cannot have the force of law in determining the federal decision.
Upon examination of two sections of the National Act thought
pertinent-Sections 3, sub a (3) and 67 sub a-the court indicated
that a California judgment lien should be regarded as a lien ob-
tained by "legal proceedings" within these two sections. Both
sections noted are designed to keep creditors with non-preferred
status from gaining that status through diligent resort to the
courts, which would violate the policy of equality among the
creditors. That policy would be as much violated by allowing the
general creditor to become a lienor by getting a judgment and
recording as it would be if he should achieve similar preferential
status by obtaining judgment alone. The only reasonable con-
struction of the two sections is that which includes a California
judgment lien among liens obtained by "legal proceedings," even
though voluntary recordation is the essential final step. In re-
gard to Section 70, the court said that it was designed to protect
general creditors against secret liens. The trustee has the rights
of a creditor who has levied attachment or execution on the prop-
erty; the California judgment creditor who has recorded is pro-
tected against secret liens. It would thus seem that the bank-
ruptcy trustee's assertion of rights of a California judgment
lienor would be consistent with the Bankruptcy Act. The court
then gave credence to the argument for consistency of interpreta-
tion of equivalent phrases, and reached the conclusion that their
former view of the case should be abandoned. The California
judgment lien, though perfected only by voluntary recordation
'Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70c. (11 USCA 110).M194 F. (2d) 228.
10
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is a lien by legal or equitable proceedings within the meaning of
Section 70 sub c.'
Applying the White, Matley, and California decisions to
Montana is somewhat difficult. The National Bankruptcy Act is
a Federal Act, national in its scope. Yet the problem here is one
of looking to the state law involved and fitting it to the national
act. In the White case, we find that the state law upon which the
decision turned is in accord with our own state law; that being
true, the natural inference would be that the White case would
govern.' There then would be little use to look to the Meyers
case or the line of California decisions discussed above." There is,
however, a situation in the Montana law which must be examined.
The 1926 case of Wall v. Duggan held that a homestead delcara-
tion filed after attachment, but before judgment, was good and
the homestead would be protected to its allowed valuation.' This
is an anomaly contrary to the weight of authority and usual rule
that the creditor secures a lien from the time of attachment. It
might produce some interesting results. As an example, suppose
that creditor A levied upon the land of debtor B. Thirty days
later, B declared a homestead conforming to the requirements of
the statute. In Montana, B would win out according to the above
rule, and A could claim only if the value of the estate exceeded
$2,500.1 Now, suppose that thirty days later B would be ad-
judged a bankrupt. Then, in Montana, B would still get his
homestead; the surplus, instead of going to A, would, under Sec-
tion 67 of the Bankruptcy Act, go to the trustee in bankruptcy."
In the majority of jurisdictions, B would have secured no right
under his declaration leaving A the sole claimant; in that case,
the entire right would go to the trustee in bankruptcy." This is
'Certiorari denied (1952) 343 U.S. 927, 69 L.Ed. 1338, 72 S.Ct. 760.
"See 145 A.L.R. at 504. ..... White v. Stump therefore applies to render
ineffective declarations filed in California after bankruptcy .... This
same rule applies in Montana declarations filed after bankruptcy. White
v. Stump also overruled re Lehfeldt (D.C. 1915) 225 F. 681, 35 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 716, which sustained a claim based on such declaration. In
re Culwell (D.C. 1908) 165 F. 828, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 614 another
Montana case, must be held to fall with the Lehfeldt case."
"Actually there is probably no separate "White v. Stump" nor "Meyers
v. Matley" doctrine. The Supreme Court of the United States recog-
nized the latter case as an extension of the former, distinguished on the
basis of the state law involved.
"0Wall v. Duggan, supra.
"See the Anno. 110 A.L.R. 904. Montana would line up on this point on
the minority side along with California, Nevada, and Washington. Ten
jurisdictions are contra, although some do not squarely face the issue.
'2Provided, of course, that the attachment of the creditor always must
come within the time requirements of § 67 of the act.
"Hemsell v. Rabb (1929) 29 F. (2) 915; In re Malone's Estate (D.C.
Idaho, 1915) 228 F. 566.
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by virtue of Section 67 sub a(1) making liens by legal proceed-
ings within four months of the petition null and void, with the
exception that the court may on due notice order any such lien
to be preserved for the benefit of the estate under Section 67 sub
a(3). But Section 6 provides that the Bankruptcy Act shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of exemptions prescribed by
state laws in force at the time of filing the petition wherein the
debtor was domiciled over the longer part of the preceding six
months.
Thus, where there is in sequence attachment, homestead filed,
and subsequent bankruptcy, Montana lawyers would do well to
look to the Meyers and California decisions and fit them to the
doctrine of the Wall case. Otherwise, it is submitted that the
doctrine of White v. Stump would require a holding that the
homestead declarant must record by declaration prior to the date
of the bankruptcy petition else the title of the bankruptcy trustee
would be superior by operation of the Bankruptcy Act as related
to local Montana law. ROBT. M. HOLTER
COURT CONTROL OVER JURY VERDICTS
When, if ever, may a jury be overruled, assuming it has
rendered a verdict on a material issue of fact, has long presented
a problem in our system of trial by jury.
As noted in Scott's Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions
at Law, from the beginning of the thirteenth century until about
the nineteenth century a procedure was followed that where a
verdict was false in fact, that is against the evidence, it could be
set aside by attaint. Thereafter, a new jury could be summoned
and if, upon consideration of the issues tried by the original
jury, it found the verdict to be false, the verdict would be re-
versed. After which, the original jury would be harshly pun-
ished. The verdict would not be reversed if it had support either
by evidence introduced or by facts not in evidence; the reason
being that during this period of history the jurors were allowed
to decide a fact considering both their own personal knowledge
of the circumstances and the evidence introduced. This advice
of controlling juries was used in this country until more modern
and effective methods of control were developed.! Thus, it is ap-
parent that there has long been a difficult struggle in an attempt
to prevent jurors from rendering unreasonable verdicts.
In the year 1655, as reported in Woody v. Guston,' the power
1Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law, 91-91.
'Style, 466; 82 Eng. Reprints, 867.
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